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INVIGORATING
JUDICIAL
DISQUALIFICATION
TEN POTENTIAL REFORMS
by JAMES SAMPLE and MICHAEL YOUNG

elected courts-to take active measures to
he time has
cometrust.
for all Without
courts-and
particularly
restore
public
a meaningful
response to legitimate concerns induced by their own
campaign-related behavior, judges cannot expect the
public to rise to their defense when their authority is
questioned on illegitimate grounds. To protect judicial
independence, courts must embrace the public demand
for accountability-in its procedural sense. Courts must
demonstrate their accountability for the decisions they
make by more aggressively distancing themselves from
situations in which their fairness and impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.
With the canons of judicial conduct looking increasingly precarious in the wake of Republican Party of Min-

nesota v. White, courts and litigants are left with precious
few reliable mechanisms to safeguard the constitutional
right to due process. Recusal is one such remaining safeguard, and, because it is tailored to the specific factual
circumstances of the case at issue, it does not trigger the
same First Amendment scrutiny as canons limiting political speech. ' To combat the growing threats to judicial
independence and impartiality-and the inadequacy of
judicial disqualification, as currently utilized -we propose here some possible solutions.
Specifically, we offer 10 proposals with the potential to
invigorate dramatically the protections offered by disqualification. We first suggest nine possible reforms to
systems of disqualification that courts could implement
unilaterally-what we will call internalsolutions. Some of
26

these reforms could also be implemented by state legislatures. We then suggest an additional reform that citizens
might undertake even without the imprimatur of the
courts-what we will call an externalsolution. We make no
claim to the originality of our list, but it offers an array of
recusal reform options for courts interested in preserving
their independence and impartiality.
We recognize that all of these proposals require tradeoffs among the benefits and risks they present. On the
one hand, strengthening disqualification rules may be a
means to safeguard due process and public trust in the
judiciary. 2 On the other hand, strengthening these rules

This article is excerpted from Fair Courts: SettingRecusalStandards, available
on the Brennan
Center for Justice website
at http://www.
brennancenter.org/content/resource/fair-courts setting recusal
standards/
1. Drawing on Justice Kennedy's concurrence in White, courts that have
invalidated canons regulating campaign speech, fundraising, or political
activity have upheld canons mandating disqualification when impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. See, e.g., Indiana Right to Life, Inc. v. Shepard, 507 E3d 545, No. 06-4123, 2007 WL 3120095, *5 (7th Cir. Oct, 26, 2007);
Kansas Judicial Watch v. Stout, 440 F. Supp. 2d 1209 (D. Kan. 2006), appeal
docketed No. 06-3290 (10th Cir. Aug. 17, 2006); Alaska Right to Life Pol.
Action Comm. v. Feldman, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1083 (D. Alaska 2005)
vacated, 504 .3d 840 (9th Cir. 2007); North Dakota Family Alliance, Inc. v.
Bader, 361 1. Supp. 2d 1021,1039 (D.N.D. 2005); Family Trust Fund of Ky. v.
Wolnitzek, 345 F. Supp. 2d 672 (E.D. Ky. 2004).
2. Sometimes one hears the argument that disqualification rules concerned with minimizing the appearance of bias will have the perverse effect
of distracting attention from more pressing issues of actual bias, of elevating
appearance over reality. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, The Real Issues ofajudicial
Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. Ri'v. 1095 (2004). This line of argument, in our view,
slights the instrumental value of avoiding the appearance of bias both for
preserving public confidence in the judiciary (and in public institutions
more generally) and, more basically, for rooting out actual bias that would
otherwise be undetectable.

JUDICATURE Volume 92, Number 1 July-August 2008

19 States allowing peremptory disqualification
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lead to "abuses"-instances in which
the litigant exercises a peremptory
strike not out of sincere due process
concerns but rather because the
assigned judge seems unfavorableand that it will burden judicial administration.5 Abuse is always a risk, but
the criticism applies equally to
peremptory challenges of venirepersons, which we nevertheless use to
promote confidence in the jury's fairness. Jurisdictions may be able to
deter peremptory challenges of
judges for truly ungrounded or offensive reasons by requiring an affidavit
explaining the challenge.
Some amount of administrative
disruption is likewise inevitable. But
by capping peremptory challenges at
one per proceeding and requiring
them to be made at an early stage
(before the removed judge has
invested time and energy familiarizing herself with the case), disruption
can be kept to a minimum. Against
these costs, the great appeal of
peremptory disqualification is that of
all the plausible reforms it provides
the most straightforward, robust protection of judicial impartiality. Even
where peremptory challenges exist
on the trial court level, however,
other measures are needed in the
context of appeals.
2. Enhanced disclosure

In the wake of the White decision,
enhanced disclosure might be one of
the simplest and most important
reforms available.Judicial candidates
now are more likely to make campaign statements on controversial
legal and policy questions. Some of
those statements-particularly when
they reflect actual or implied promises about how the judge will decide
certain classes of cases-might support reasonable doubts about the
judge's impartiality. Judges could be
required to file with their clerk's
office copies or transcripts of all campaign advertising and statements,
which the court could then make
available for public inspection by
parties in a case. Without such disclosure requirements, the burden of
tracking down such information may
be prohibitive for many litigants.
28

Similarly, judges could be
required to disclose information about their campaign
finances. Although campaign
finance laws in every state
now mandate reporting of
campaign contributions and
expenditures,' the stringency
and enforcement of disclosure provisions vary widely.
Even when disclosure rules
are sound, moreover, information about a particular
judge may be difficult to
obtain. In states with canons
proscribing the direct solicitation of contributions by
judicial candidates, the court
clerk's office might be asked
to provide the parties with
campaign finance reports, so
that these disclosures do not
vitiate efforts by conscientious judges to insulate themselves from the potentially
distorting influence of that
information.
More generally, at the outset of
the litigation, judges could be
required to disclose orally or in writing any facts that might plausibly be
construed as bearing on the judges'
impartiality. Such a mandatory disclosure scheme would shift some of
the costs of disqualification-related
fact finding from the litigant to the
state. It would also increase the reputational and professional cost to
judges who fail to disclose pertinent
information that later emerges
through another source.
States
have
taken
various
approaches on this front. Most states
have adopted the Model Code's Rule
2.11(A) (see page 10) in one form or
another. However, states have differed
on whetherjudges are required to dis5. See Debra Lyn Bassett, JudicialDisqualification
in the FederalAppellate Courts, 87 IOWA L. Rev. 1213,
1254 (2002).
6. See RicHARD E. FLAMM, JUDicIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES §

3.8, at 76-79 (1996) (describing peremptory disqualification jurisdictions that require the filing
of a timely motion, a supportive affidavit, and a
certification of good faith in order for disqualification to be granted).
7. See Stuart Banner, Note, Disqualifying Elected
Judgesfrom CasesInvolving Campaign Contributors,40
STAN. L. REv. 449, 463-66 (1988). ("All fifty states
and the District of Columbia require candidates
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close any information that might be
considered relevant for recusal or disqualification purposes. Iowa requires
that a judge disclose on the record
information the judge believes might
be relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes
there is no real basis for disqualification.' However, in Michigan, a judge
is not required to disclose any information concerning disqualification
but is merely encouraged to do so by
the applicable canon.'
To further enhance the disclosure
of relevant information concerning
disqualification, some states provide
a centralized system through which
attorneys and their clients can review
a judge's recusal history. Alaska
courts utilize a system that assigns a
for elective office to file reports disclosing all campaign contributions and, for contributions over a
certain amount, the names of contributors.").
8. IOWA CODE § 602.1606 (2006); see also Iowa
Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(D) (2007)
(stating that instead of remitting or disqualifying
himself/herself a judge may disclose the relevant
information concerning disqualification to the
parties and receive written consent to proceed as
the adjudicator despite the potential conflict).
9. Mich. Code Judicial Conduct 3(C) (2007).
10. Recusal Survey, National Center for State
Courts, Alaska Survey Response (2007) (on file
with author).

special code to cases that have been
reassigned due to a judge's recusal.
The database of these cases is accessible to the public, allowing one to
track the number of recusals for a
specific judge. Parties interested in
determining the reasons for the
recusals, however, must inspect the
individual case files, as such information is not stored in the database."0
Objections to these proposals
might emphasize the added burden
on judges or clerks, the potential
intrusiveness on judges' privacy, or
the low probability thatjudges would
disclose many of the most relevant
facts. (For example, no one will say,
"I am a racist" or "I feel beholden to
the trial lawyers who supported my
campaign.") The practical burden
on judges is small, however, and the
marginal cost to their privacy is
slighter still, because judges already
have an ethical obligation to disclose
pertinent facts, even if this obligation has not been formalized into a
legal rule." While it may be true that
no disclosure policy could force
judges to disclose their biases and
interests when they are unwilling to
do so (or are ignorant of their existence), this weakness is not an argument againstenhanced disclosure; it
just indicates that enhanced disclosure is a partial solution. Disclosure
is also an incomplete solution in the
sense that it provides only the
grounds for disqualification; it does
not guarantee that a judge will
recuse herself when the grounds are
made known.

11. Judges do have a general ethical obligation
to disclose possible grounds for their disqualification. See FLAMM, supra n. 6, § 19.10.2, at 579. The
ABA Model Code stipulates that "[a] judge should
disclose on the record information that the judge
believes the parties or their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification,
even if the judge believes there is no real basis for
disqualification. Notice, however, that this stipulation appears only in the Commentary and is
phrased in hortatory, not mandatory terms.
Legally, litigants "cannot require an unwilling
judge to disclose facts and opinions." John Leubsdorf, Theories ofJudgingandJudicialDisqualification,
62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 237, 242 (1987).
12. SeeJohn Copeland Nagle, The ReeusalAlternative to Campaign Finance Legislation, 37 HARv.J. ON
LEGIS. 69, 87 (2003) (citing numerous examples);
see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Public Citizen in
Support of Reversal 1, Republican Party of Minn. v.
White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (No. 01-521) (describing Public Citizen's unsuccessful challenge to

3. Per se rules for campaign contributors

"The improper appearance created by money in
judicial elections is one
of the most important
issues facing our judicial
system today. A line
needs to be drawn somewhere to prevent ajudge
from hearing cases
involving a person who
has made massive campaign contributions to
benefit the judge."
-Theodore

B. Olson, former

Solicitor General of the United
States.
To address the concern about judges
who decline to recuse themselves
when their campaign finances reasonably call into question their impartiality, the ABA has recommended
mandatory disqualification of any
judge who has accepted large contributions from a party appearing before
her. Current recusal doctrine makes it
extremely difficult to disqualify a
judge for having received contributions from a litigant or her lawyer,"
even though there is ample evidence
to suggest that these contributions
create not only the appearance of bias
but also actual bias in judicial decision
making. This problem is only going
to grow more acute in the coming
years, as judicial election campaigns
become increasingly expensive.

Texas's system, "which allows large campaign contributions by lawyers and others with interests
before the courts but does not require recusal of
judges when contributors appear before them").
Professor Nagle notes that academia has sided
squarely with the ABA on this issue: "Indeed, the
scholatly opinion is just as unanimous that a campaign contribution should require a judge to
recuse as the courts are agreed that recusal is
unnecessary." Nagle, supra, at 88 (providing citations to scholarly critiques).
13. SeeFlamm, supran. 6. § 6.4.1, atch. 12 (citing recent empirical studies finding a significant
correlation between campaign contributions and
litigation success rates).
14. ABA MODEL CODE, Canon 2, R. 2.11 (A) (4).
Note that the language cited was adopted in 2007
and differs from its 1999 predecessor in that it
includes the phrase "or the law firm of a party's
lawyer." "Aggregate contributions" are meant to
include both direct and indirect gifts made to a
candidate. Id. at terminology.

"[Y] ou do not have to
do away with elections
and or even fund-raising
to make a drastic
improvement in the quality of justice in state
courts around the nation.
All you need to do is listen to Professor [Vernon
Valentine] Palmer. If a
judge has taken money
from a litigant or a
lawyer, Professor Palmer
says, the judge has no
business ruling on that
person's case."
-Adam Liptak, Looking Anew at
Campaign Cash and Elected Judges,
NEW YORK TIMES, Jan. 29, 2008.
Since 1999 (and with minor
updating in 2007 that is reflected in
the text below) the ABA's Model
Code has included a provision prescribing disqualification
of an
elected judge when:
The judge knows or learns by means of

a timely motion that a party, a party's
lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer
has within the previous [insert number]
year[s] made aggregate contributions to
the judge's campaign in an amount that
[is greater than $ [insert amount] for an
individual or $[insert amount] for an
entity] [is reasonable and appropriate
for an individual or an entity].,

By setting a maximum threshold,
the ABA's per se rule eliminates
lawyers' incentive to curry favor
through large contributions. By allowing contributions below that threshold, the ABA rule respects the fact
that in many races the local bar will be
in the best position to evaluate the
candidates' merits-and if lawyers do
not support candidates' campaigns,
special interests and self-funding will
likely dominate judicial campaign
finance.
However, the ABA provision has yet
to be adopted or applied by any state.
Indeed, the ABA position is not just
ignored; it is inverted in the prevailing
jurisprudence, in which motions to
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disqualify ajudge for campaign contributions "hardly ever succeed.""
Motions to disqualify because a party
or attorney has provided other types
of campaign support, such as public
endorsement or participation on the
judge's campaign staff, have met a
similar fate."5 Motions to disqualify for
failure to contribute money, time, or
support to a judge's election campaign have fared even worse. 7 One
state (Alabama) had a similar policy in
place at the time of the ABA's revision, 8 but it appears to be rarely
applied, as judges are unclear about
the statute's legal status. 9 Mississippi
includes campaign donations by counsel to the presiding judge as a factor
available to parties moving for
recusal2 However, the Mississippi
statute falls well short of any sort of
threshold standard, and, as a factor in
the recusal determination, donations
are not given any special weight.
Two problems with the ABA's formulation of the rule may help to
explain why no states have adopted
it. First, in states with reasonable contribution limits, the potential for real
or apparent corruption is largely
addressed by the limits, which no
individual may legally exceed. Under
those circumstances, the ABA rule
adds little to the campaign finance
regime in protecting ajudge's impartiality. Those jurisdictions would be
better served by a rule that triggers
disqualification after receipt of
aggregate contributions of a certain
amount not from a single dono, but
collectively from all donors associated with a party to the litigation
(such as corporate officers or management-level employees) or with
counsel (such as law firm partners
who have given in their individual
capacity). This modification of the
rule would also augment its efficacy
in jurisdictions that lack reasonable
contribution limits.2 Concededly,
precise line-drawing in terms of the
scope and breadth of language pertaining to contribution aggregation
is difficult, and preferences will vary
based on many factors including
jurisdiction. In that regard, the suggested language below is offered for
consideration both in itself, and as a
30

potential point of departure.
Second, the mandatory disqualification required by the ABA rule
invites gamesmanship that could
defeat its purpose. If the contribution
threshold were set at a reasonable
level, parties or lawyers could disqualify an unfavorable judge by making
contributions (or aggregate contributions) above that amount to her campaign committee. To prevent such
gaming of the system, any party whose
opposition (or counsel for the opposition) contributed to the judge
should be permitted to waive disqualification. A waiver is preferable to
requiring a motion for disqualification because it keeps the onus on the
court to disclose campaign finance
information.22 Thus, the ABA rule
would be improved, and perhaps
more likely to be adopted, if it were to
require disqualification when:
the judge knows or learns by means of a
timely motion that a party, a party's
lawyer, or the officers, partners, or other
management-level employees of that
party or of the law firm of the party's
lawyer,
has within
the
previous
[ ] year[s] made aggregate contributions
to the judge's campaign in an amount
that is greater than [$ ] for an individual
or [$ ] for an entity. Disqualification
under this section may be waived by any

15. Nagle, supra n. 12; see also Brief of Amicus
Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Reversal 1,
Republican Party of Minn. xt White, supra n. 12.
Courts have been more sympathetic to disqualification motions when the campaign contribution
at issue is particularly large, particularly close in
time to the proceeding, or supplemented by additional campaign activity. See, e.g., MacKenzie v.
Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So.2d 1332,
1338 n.5 (Fla. 1990) ("Although a motion for disqualification based solely upon a legal campaign
contribution is not legally sufficient, it may well be
that such a contribution, in conjunction with some
additional factor, would constitute legally sufficient
grounds for disqualification upon motion.");
Pierce v. Pierce, 39 .3d 791, 798 (Okla. 2001)
(indicating that the size, timing, and manner of
judicial campaign contributions may be relevant to
the disqualification determination).
16. SeeFAMM, supra n. 6, § 6.4.3, at 191-94.
17. See id. § 6.5, at 194-96. Some courts have
denied disqualification when the moving party or
her counsel did not merely provide political sup
port to the judge's opponent, but in fact was the
opponent. Id. § 6.5, at 195-96.
18. Ala. Code § 12-24-2(c) (Supp. 2000). Cf
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 24, Jones v. Btrnside, 127 S. Ct. 576 (2006) (No. 06-53) (identifying Alabama as the only state with a similar
provision to the ABA's Canon 2, R. 2.11(A)(4);
Peter A. Joy, A ProfessionalismCreedforJ dges: Leading by Example, 52 S. C. L. REv. 667, 675 & n.28
(2001) (identifying Alabama as the only state that
clearly requires elected judges to recuse or be disqualified when faced with major contributors and
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party, provided that the party, the party's
lawyer, or the officers, partners, or other
management-level employees of that
party or of the law firm of the party's
lawyer, have not made such contibutions.

4. Independent adjudication
of disqualification motions

"The uproar over conflicts of interest at the
West Virginia Supreme
Court calls into question
the practice of giving
judges the final say in
their recusals - even
when they're faced with
demands to step down...
'There's a lot not to like
in leaving it up to the
conscience of the individual judge,' said Deborah
Rhode, director of the
Center for Ethics at Stanford University's law
school."
-The Associated Press,
Massey-Maynard photos highlight
judicial recusal rule, The HeraldDispatch, January 27, 2008

arguing that disqualification in these instances
should be automatic).
19. See Val Walton, Suit Claims Governor AG Not
Enforcing Campaign Law, Birmingham News, Aug. 2,
2006, at 2B; see also Finley v. Patterson, 705 So. 2d
834, 835 n.1 (Ala. 1997) (Cook, J., concurring)
(describing the enforcement of Ala. Code § 12-242 as being "in legal limbo" because it was not precleared under the Voting Rights Act); Brackin v.
Trimmier Law Firm, 897 So. 2d 207, 230-34 (Ala.
2004) (Brown, J., statement of nonrecusal) (stating, "I am not aware of any opinions in which this
Court has resolved the issue of the enforceability of
§§ 12-24-1 and -2," and refusing to recuse despite
contributions of more than $50,000 from an amicus
curiae PAC affiliated with one of the parties).
20. Mississippi has added a provision to its Code
of Judicial Conduct indicating that "[a] party may
file a motion to recuse a judge based on the fact
that an opposing party or counsel of record for that
party is a major donor to the election campaign of
such judge" and stipulating that such motions will
be evaluated like any other recusal motion. Miss.
CODE OFjUDICL L CODUCT Canon 3E(2) (2002). As
if to clarify how dramatically this provision falls
short of the ABA's Canon 2, R. 2.11 (A) (4), the official commentary notes that "[tjhis provision does
not appear in the ABA Model Code of Judicial
Conduct." Id. Canon 3E(2) cmt.
21. In the Illinois race for Supreme Court at
issue in Avery v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company, for example, State Farm made no contributions to Karmeier, but individuals and entities
closely associated with it contributed more than
$1 million to his campaign.

"By not recusing himself
from the appeal of a $50
million jury verdict against
A.T. Massey Coal Company
("Massey") -after he
received over $3 million in
post-verdict, pre-appeal
campaign support from
Massey's CEO-West
Virginia Supreme Court
Justice Brent Benjamin
created an appearance of
bias that would diminish
the integrity of the judicial
process in the eyes of any
reasonable person."
"A holding by the Court
that the Due Process
Clause required Justice
Benjamin's recusal would
provide crucial guidance
to elected judges and preserve public confidence in
judicial elections. Such
confidence is of particular
value to those engaged in
commerce, who rely on
even-handed justice to
make informed financial
and investment decisions."
-Brief amicus curiae, Committee for Economic Development, in
support of the petition filed with the
U.S. Supreme Court in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22
The fact thatjudges in manyjurisdictions decide on their own recusal
challenges, with little to no prospect
22. Canon 2, R.2.11(C) ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct appears to permit waiver when
both parties agree to it. But requiring mutual consent perpetuates the potential for gamesmanship.
23. TEx. R. Cirv. PRO. 18a(c) (2007).
24. See Maynard-Massey Flap Triggers Recusal
Legislation, The Intelligencer / Wheeling NewsRegister, Feb. 1, 2008, http://www.theintelligencer.net/page/content.detail/id/38554.html?i
sap=l&nav 535.
25. Abimbola Olowofoyeku, Regulating Supreme
Court Recusals, 2006 SING J. LEGAL STUD. 60, 69
(internal citations and quotations omitted). Recall
that this objective standard is the centerpiece of
modern American disqualification practice and
has been codified into law nearly everywhere.

of immediate review, is one of the
most heavily criticized features of
United States disqualification lawand for good reason. Recusal
motions are not like other procedural motions. They challenge the
fundamental legitimacy of the adjudication. They also challenge the
judge in a very personal manner:
they speculate on her interests and
biases; they may imply unattractive
things about her. Understanding this
tension, Texas and several other
states require that motions for disqualification be independently adjudicated. Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure require that when ajudge
is presented with a motion for disqualification, the judge may choose
one of two options before proceeding further in the trial: the judge
may recuse herself, or the judge may
request that the presiding judge
assign another judge to hear and
23
rule on the motion.
In the face of mounting controversy surrounding its recusal laws, the
West Virginia legislature is considering a different approach to independent adjudication of recusal motions. 4
Lawmakers there have proposed a resolution that would amend the state's
constitution and create a judicial
recusal commission. The commission
would be composed of acting or
retired judges appointed by the governor, upon advice of the state senate, to
serve six-year terms. Parties seeking
the recusal of a judge would simply
submit an application to the commission to have thatjudge removed, upon
which the commission would then
issue a binding decision on the matter.
Allowingjudges to decide on their
own recusal motions is in tension not
only with the guarantee of a neutral
26. R. Matthew Pearson, Note, Duck Duck
Recuse? Foreign Common Law Guidance& Improving
Recusal of Supreme CourtJustices, 62 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 1799, 1833-34 (2005), at 1833 (internal citations omitted).
27. Indeed, one might argue that a challenged
judge's colleagues are not independent enough to
rule on her disqualification motion, on account of
the collegiality and reciprocity pressures that they
will likely face in such situations. One might therefore prefer the use of outside arbiters instead. We
find this idea intriguing and not necessarily outlandish, but we do not address it here because of
the deep practical and possibly constitutional concerns that any such scheme would raise.

decision maker, but also with the
explicit commitment to objectivity in
this arena. "Since the question
whether ajudge's impartiality 'might
reasonably be questioned' is a
'purely objective' standard"-a standard that virtually every state has
adopted-"it would seem to follow
logically that the judge whose impartiality is being challenged should not
have the final word on the question
whether his or her recusal is 'necessary' or required.'

'

Against these arguments, several
prudential objections are typically
offered in favor of judges making
their own recusal decisions. As one
commentator sets out the core claims:
The primary benefit of the individual
determination model is that the person
with the best knowledge of the facts is
the person who resolves whether the
circumstances support recusal. Individ-

ual determination may also reduce the

number of recusal "fishing expeditions"
because parties will be reluctant to
approach an individual [judge] with

weak evidentiary support for a disqualification motion. The single-judge procedure also enhances judicial efficiency
because it avoids prolonged fact-finding

hearings before recusal decisions."

None of these critiques is wholly
misguided, but we do not find them
compelling. The challenged judge
may have the best knowledge of the
facts, but the very biases or conflicts
of interest that prompted the challenge in the first place may prevent
her from fairly evaluating the import
of those facts. In addition, the judge
may fear that granting a disqualification motion will send the signal that
she is biased, even if she is not, and
that it will raise questions about why
she failed to recuse herself sua sponte.
"Fishing expeditions" should be
deterred by the fact that the thirdparty decision makers will be judges
themselves, and so will have a professional and personal interest in ensuring that such expeditions do not
flourish.27 (Sanctions might also be
used for frivolous challenges.) And
while independent adjudication of
recusal motions does raise efficiency
costs, those costs should not be substantial if decisions are based on written affidavits and oral argument,
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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rather than full-blown
hearings. The increased
integrity and public trust
an independent decision
be well worth the price.

adversarial
procedural
fostered by
maker may

5. Transparent and
reasoned decision making

Judicial disqualification in many
jurisdictions is something of a black
box: there is no systematic record of
how disqualification motions are
decided or on what grounds. The
failure of many judges to explain
their recusal decisions, and the lack
of a policy forcing them do so,
offends not only a basic tenet of legal
process, but also a basic tenet of liberal democracy-that officials must
give public reasons for their actions
in order for those actions to be legitimate." The lack of public reasongiving also creates less abstract
problems: it stymies and distorts the
development of precedent, it
deprives appellate courts of materials for review, and it allows judges to
avoid conscious grappling with the
charges made against them. To remedy these problems, all judges who
rule on a disqualification motion
should be required to explain their
decision in writing or on the record,
even if only briefly.
Most states require that a ruling
on a motion for disqualification be
executed in writing, either through
a written order or a bench decision
on the record." However, in practice, this procedural requirement
does not guarantee any discussion
whatsoever of the reasons for disqualification. California has supplemented this process somewhat by
requiring that certain information
be disclosed to the parties in
regards to a disqualification hearing." Specifically, parties are entitled to receive a copy of any written
answer a judge may file regarding
disqualification. Yet even measures
such as these do not necessarily
enhance precedent or the materials
available for appellate review. Any
sort of measure requiring judges to
explain the basis for their disqualification decisions would be preferable.
32

6. De novo review
on interlocutory appeal

The perfunctory abuse-of-discretion
standard of review applied to recusal
decisions in nearly every jurisdiction
has drawn its fair share of critics. 1
Making appellate review more searching would be less important if the
other reforms on this list were
adopted, but it would still provide a
valuable safeguard against partiality. It
would also provide a measure of discipline for lower court judges, who

even splits at the appellate level can
raise serious problems of gamesmanship, and it undermines the precedential value of the resulting
decisions. It is therefore important
that regardless of which recusal policies they adopt, courts have in place
mechanisms for efficiently replacing
a disqualified judge. s2
8. Expanded commentary in the Canons
Expanding the canon commentary
on recusal would be a classic "soft"

IT IS IMPORTANT THAT COURTS
HAVE IN PLACE MECHANISMS
FOR EFFICIENTLY REPLACING
A DISQUALIFIED JUDGE.
would face a higher risk of disqualification-and the attendant professional embarrassment-for erroneous
recusal decisions. Evidence from the
Seventh Circuit, the only federal
appeals court to review recusal determinations de novo, might shed some
light on why such a standard is desirable.
In addition to adopting a more
meaningful standard of appellate
review, courts could improve their
procedures for appeal. While the
standard mechanisms for filing an
appeal-interlocutory
orders,
motions for reconsideration, and
post-trial petitions-all have a role to
play, interlocutory orders offer litigants the earliest opportunity for
relief. In jurisdictions in which independent adjudication of the recusal
motion is not implemented at the
trial court level, encouraging or
requiring appellate courts to accept
interlocutory orders in a timely manner (which rarely happens at present)
may provide a second-best alternative.

7. Mechanisms for replacing
disqualified appellate judges
In states that do not designate a substitute for a disqualified appellate
judge recusal of ajudge can result in
even splits. The potential for such

JUDICATURE Volume 92, Number 1 July-August 2008

solution for regulating its practice.
This reform would be of limited
value, both because of the commentary's weak legal stature and because
the discussion cannot cover all possible situations. Nevertheless, it would
be relatively costless to do, and it
would promote adherence to higher
ethical standards by clarifying when
recusal is advisable, if not strictly
28. See Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearences: A
Process Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U.
KAN. L. Rav. 531 560-63, 569-70, 588-90 (2005)
(describing public reason-giving as a core tenet of
Legal Process theory and recommending its
incorporation into the practice ofjudicial disqualification).
29. See, e.g., CoLO .R. CIV .PRO. 97 (2007)
(requiring that "all other proceedings in [a] case
shall be suspended until a ruling is made" on the
disqualification motion (emphasis added)); COLO
.R. Civ PRO. 58 (2007) (explaining that all judgments, decrees, and orders must be entered in
writing).
30. CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 170.3(c)(3) (West
2007).
31. See, e.g., Paul G. Lewis, Systemic Due Process:
ProceduralConcepts and the Problem of Rerusal, 38 U.
KAN. L. REv. 381, 407 (1990) (critiquing the abuse
of discretion standard for not providing meaningful protection against judicial misconduct); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Rehnquist, Recusal, and Reform, 53
BROOK L. REv. 589, 661-62 (1987) (same).
32. This problem has already received a great
deal of attention at the federal level. See, e.g.,
Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 541 U.S. 913,
915-16 (2004) (mem. of Scalia, J.); Laird v. Tatum,
409 U.S. 824, 837-38 (1972) (mem. of Rehnquist,
J.); Ryan Black & Lee Epstein, Recusals and the
"Problem" of an Equally Divided Supreme Court, 7 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 75 (2005); Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86
HARv. L. REv. 736, 748-50 (1973); Pearson, supra
n. 26, at 1806, 1836-37.

required. The commentary could
also be expanded to provide more
examples of situations meriting disqualification-for instance, representative campaign statements that
might reasonably be interpreted as
indicating a commitment to a particular outcome in certain types of proceedings-which would make it
tougher for judges to deny disqualification motions based on similar
3
facts.

its current flawed state.

An external solution:
Recusal advisory bodies
Outside observers need not sit idly
by as judges consider the previous
reforms. In some states in which
there is heightened concern about
the fallout from White and other
pressures to abandon ethical standards, bar associations or other
groups of volunteers have created
committees to monitor judicial cam-

INVIGORATING RECUSAL
WOULD HELP COURTS TO SEIZE
THE HIGH GROUND AND RECOVER
PUBLIC RESPECT.
9. Judicial education
Seminars for judges that enable
them to confront the standard critiques of disqualification law might

provide another soft solution for
invigorating its practice. Judges
could be instructed on the likely
underuse and underenforcement of
disqualification motions, the social
psychological research into bias, the
importance of avoiding the appearance of partiality, and so forth. These
seminars might also review potential
reforms to recusal doctrines and
court rules. Beyond their specific
teachings, simply having such seminars might help to foster a legal culture in which there is deeper
awareness of disqualification law and
33. In revising the Model Code, the ABA
appears to have made some minor additions to
the commentary on its disqualification provision,
but much more could still be done (of note are
comments two and six which clarify that the disqualification rules apply regardless of whether a
motion to disqualify has been filed and elaborate
on the meaning of 'economic interest,' respectively).
34. See Chief Justice Joseph E. Lambert, Contestable Judicial Elections: Maintaining Respectability
in the Post-White Era,94 Kv. LJ. 1, 13 (2005) (summarizing the work of these committees in
Alabama, Florida, Kentucky, and Ohio); see also
The Way Forward: Lessons from the National Symposium on Judicial Campaign Conduct and the First
Amendment, 35 IND. L. RaV. 649, 655 (2002) (recommending the creation of official and unofficial
campaign conduct committees "to help assure
appropriate campaign conduct").

paign conduct." These groups serve
both as a resource for candidates
who want to take the high road, by
offering them cover for the refusal to
lower their standards, and as a
source of corrective public education when advertising in judicial
campaigns (by candidates, political
parties, or interest groups) is false or
misleading. The most effective committees often have no official status;
they work by drawing attention to
problems and keeping participants
in the electoral process accountable
for their behavior.
A similar model might be followed
with respect to recusal. Advisory bodies could identify best practices and
encourage judges to set high standards for themselves. Judges could be
encouraged to seek guidance from
the advisory body when faced with difficult issues of recusal. Ajudge accepting such advice could expect a public
defense if a disgruntled party criticized a decision not to recuse. In contrast, the advisory body could disclose
when a judge has ignored advice
favoring disqualification. The publicity would create pressure for the
judges to follow recusal recommendations or to specify clear reasons for
their decision to sit on a case.

Conclusion
We have by no means catalogued all
of the possible changes to recusal
doctrine and practice that could
enhance the accountability of judges
and protect their independence. But
even the few proposals briefly outlined here could compensate for
some of the evident weaknesses in
current disqualification standards
and help to protect the real and
apparent impartiality of the courts.
The challenge for elected judges,
whose campaign supporters may well
want them to rule on cases from
which they should be disqualified, will
be to overcome pressures to maintain
the status quo. The rising attacks on
the judiciary may provide the needed
incentives for recusal reform.
We acknowledge that, although
recusal reform is badly needed, it is
less than a perfect solution to the
problems arising in the aftermath of
White. Recusal is an incomplete safeguard of judicial fairness and impartiality because it is an individualized,
case-specific remedy and so protects
only against harms to particular litigants. Front-end, systemic protections, such as non-elective judicial
selection methods or canons prohibiting conduct that undermines
real and perceived judicial impartiality, are ultimately preferable. But the
fact is that as those protections are
being scaled back or stricken, the
back-end disqualification of judges
who appear to be biased is becoming
all the more important as a protection of last resort. Invigorating
recusal would help courts currently
under siege to seize the high ground
and recover the respect of a disenchanted public. v
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